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Editors’Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL on Economic Activity held its seventy-second con-
ference in Washington, D.C., on September 6 and 7, 2001. This issue of
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity includes the papers and discus-
sions presented at the conference. The first paper revisits the economy of
the former East Germany ten years after reunification, seeking to explain
why its convergence toward western German economic performance has
stalled. The second paper reviews macroeconomic policymaking in Japan
to determine whether the stagnant Japanese economy has responded to
policy stimulus as conventional models would predict. The third paper
tests alternative explanations of the greater generosity of social welfare
systems in Europe than in the United States. And the concluding paper
attempts to reconcile the observed high return on equities with reasonable
levels of risk aversion on the part of individuals.
THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY, which began with a bloodless revolu-
tion in 1989, was one of the most dramatic economic and political events
of the twentieth century. The process of integration that began officially
in 1990 with economic, social, and monetary union provides a vivid case
study in the difﬁculties, even under highly favorable conditions, in achiev-
ing the convergence of living standards in two regions at very different lev-
els of development. The less developed former East Germany faced no
language barrier; it could easily import the political, legal, and economic
system of the west; its people could migrate freely; and it received massive
inflows of capital. In the first paper of this issue, Michael Burda and
Jennifer Hunt examine in detail the economic performance of eastern and
western Germany during the first decade after reunification, analyzing
changes in output, employment, investment, consumption, and wages to
better understand the productivity gains of the east. 
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identifies a number of surprises, both good and bad. After an initial dras-
tic decline, eastern Germany’s GDP per capita grew rapidly from 1992 to
1995, reaching two-thirds of western levels. Labor productivity, consump-
tion per capita, and wages did even better, rising to more than 70 percent
of western levels by mid-decade. The authors illustrate the convergence
in consumption by comparing rates of household ownership of selected
consumer durables. In 1991 few eastern Germans owned dishwashers,
microwave ovens, video cameras, refrigerator-freezers, or even telephones.
But by 1998, 44 percent of eastern German households had dishwashers,
54 percent had microwaves, 38 percent had video cameras, 35 percent
had refrigerator-freezers, and 97 percent had telephones. By that year the
prevalence of ownership of automobiles, telephones, color television sets,
refrigerators, refrigerator-freezers, stereos, video cameras, and washing
machines was essentially the same for eastern and western Germans. 
This convergence is impressive and happened much faster than previous
studies of regional convergence would have predicted. Viewed from the
end of the decade, however, prospects for complete convergence do not
seem as bright. Since 1995, consumption and GDP per capita, wages, and
labor productivity have all been stuck at essentially the same fraction of
their western counterparts. And whereas output and consumption have
more than regained the ground lost following the initial shock of the tran-
sition, the labor market has yet to recover. Various measures give differ-
ent indications of the extent of unemployment: survey measures suggest
that unemployment averaged 13 percent from 1994 to 1999; official esti-
mates are higher, with unemployment approaching 20 percent in 1998, or
27 percent if estimates of hidden unemployment are included. The share of
the eastern working-age population that is employed declined from 83 per-
cent in 1990 to 65 percent in 1999. 
To help explain the early successes and the more disappointing perfor-
mance that followed, the authors undertake a careful analysis of eastern
Germany’s output growth, grounding it in a conventional growth account-
ing framework. They believe much of the large gap in labor productivity
between east and west in 1990 reflected the relatively low capital-labor
ratio in the east. Given political stability and ﬁrmly established rules for a
pan-German market economy, this difference in the capital-labor ratio pro-
vided a powerful incentive both for labor migration to the west and for
capital accumulation in the east, the latter from both capital inflows and
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conﬁguration of the German economy in long-run equilibrium, when fac-
tor returns have been equalized, will depend on the importance of each of
these channels during convergence. If labor migration to the west is slow
and capital inflows to the east are large, the eventual distribution of out-
put and employment will be roughly proportional to the initial populations
in east and west. If instead labor is highly mobile but capital is slow to
move, output and population in the east will be much smaller in equilib-
rium. And if capital inflows are small enough, internal saving in the east
could be so low that net investment would be negative, and the east could
largely empty out. 
The authors go on to analyze what has actually happened thus far. In
assessing the importance of capital formation in the east during the last
decade, they focus on investment in equipment. They believe that this,
rather than structures, is the key bottleneck to development, and that data
on structures are, in any case, a poor measure of capital services provided.
Cumulative net investment in equipment during 1991–98 was impressive,
totaling DM 504 billion at 1995 prices, roughly equivalent to current real
GDP in the eastern states. By comparison, cumulative net equipment
investment in the west during the same period was about two-thirds of its
GDP. In contrast to this rapid growth of the capital stock, the labor force in
the east actually declined after reunification. From 1988 to 1999 the reg-
istered population in eastern Germany fell by nearly 9 percent; net emi-
gration to western Germany and an excess of deaths over births were the
two main sources of the gross decline (accounting for 7.2 and 4.7 per-
centage points, respectively; these were partly offset by an influx of
migrants from abroad). The time pattern of migration itself is fascinating.
East Germany suffered outflows in 1989 and 1990 of 2.5 percent of its
population. Emigration soon fell to about half that rate, but immigration to
the east, including returnees, also rose, leaving only modest net population
outﬂows after the mid-1990s. As would be expected, the young have been
the most likely to move. Among the population that remained, labor force
participation rates declined between 1991 and 2000, by 6 percentage
points for men and by 5 percentage points for women. 
Burda and Hunt calculate that, even assuming an initial equipment
stock of zero, accumulation had led by 1998 to an equipment capital–
output ratio in the east of roughly 75 to 90 percent of that in the west. As
Janet Yellen shows in her discussion of the paper, a capital shortfall of the
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shortfall in labor productivity if the aggregate production functions in
east and west were identical. Hence much of the remaining difference
between eastern and western labor productivity is likely to reflect lower
total factor productivity (TFP). 
Applying the standard Solow decomposition of output growth since
1991, the authors ﬁnd that TFP growth in the east was strikingly higher in
the first than in the second half of the decade. Output grew at a remark-
able 6.8 percent annual rate during 1992–95 despite a decline in employ-
ment that contributed a negative 1.8 percent a year to output growth. The
rapid growth of the capital stock more than offset this decline, with capi-
tal contributing 4.2 percent a year. This leaves TFP rising by an extraor-
dinary 4.4 percent a year. The authors estimate that, following this surge,
TFP actually declined by about 1 percent a year during 1995–99. This
development appears systematic, affecting all the eastern states in the same
qualitative fashion. At the same time, TFP growth in the western states,
which had been essentially zero during the early years of integration,
returned to slightly over 1 percent during the later period, close to its his-
torical norm. 
The authors note that a large portion of the initial surge in productivity
and wages may have nothing to do with these customary sources of growth
but instead represented movement toward the efficient production frontier.
Some firms reduced employment by as much as 80 to 90 percent, sug-
gesting that some of the productivity surge came from firms discharging
redundant labor and from other profit-driven reorganization. If these
potential sources of productivity growth were fully exploited in the early
part of the decade, they help explain the lack of convergence in TFP since
1995 and imply that further convergence will be hard to achieve.
The authors pay careful attention to the possibility that inferior labor
quality explains the lower productivity of labor in the east. One hypothesis
is that workers’experience under communism is less valuable in a capi-
talist economy, so that in effect some human capital was lost by the tran-
sition. They confirm earlier findings by Alan Krueger and Jörn-Steffen
Pischke that the return to experience fell between 1989 and 1990, but they
also suggest that the experience gap may be less than it appears. Compar-
ing compensation in east and west for workers with comparable “skill”—
which they define in terms of a number of characteristics including age,
education, and job tenure—they investigate how the east-west difference
xii Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2001
0332-01  BPEA  Editors  Sum    1/3/02    15:29    Page  xiichanged between 1990 and 1999. To do this, they estimate the reward to
skill from a wage equation run on a sample of westerners during the period
1984–89. They then use the estimated coefficients from this equation to
predict what individual workers in the east would have received in the west
in 1988. For 1990 a plot of these easterners’ actual wages in the east
against their predicted wages in the west shows a substantial gap at the
mean skill level, with the gap growing as skill increases. The result is
similar for both men and women. It indicates that the returns to skill were
lower in the east than in the west and, if wage rates reflect productivity,
suggests that the scarcity of capital in the east was particularly detrimen-
tal to skilled labor. By 1999 eastern wages had largely caught up to what
would have been expected in the west in 1988, and the skill discount had
disappeared. Indeed, for women it appears that skill is, if anything, more
highly rewarded in the east. 
The authors also consider a variety of other factors that may have been
responsible for the productivity growth slowdown in the second half of the
1990s. They briefly discuss the potential role of shortages of managerial
talent, entrepreneurship, and marketing skills and the possible impact of
credit constraints. Another candidate is the slowdown in the growth of eco-
nomic infrastructure in the east. At the start of the decade, eastern Ger-
many’s infrastructure was severely deficient. Immense outlays since
reunification have narrowed that gap, but the pace of that narrowing has
slowed with time, and the east’s infrastructure is still regarded as inferior
to the west’s. 
To explore the possibility that a slowdown in narrowing the infrastruc-
ture gap could help account for the observed pattern of productivity
growth, the authors regress the annual Solow residuals, for both eastern
and western states, taken from their previous analysis for 1992–99 on real
infrastructure per capita (in some cases disaggregated by type), unem-
ployment, and a set of variables characterizing the size of ﬁrms, along with
eastern and western dummy variables interacted with unemployment. The
equations also include ﬁxed effects for each eastern and western state and
separate time effects for east and west. The authors find a substantial and
statistically significant effect for total real infrastructure and for infra-
structure disaggregated by type. Their results indicate that a 10 percent
decline in the growth of infrastructure equipment—not a large change
relative to its growth rates in the decade—would reduce TFP growth by
approximately 0.8 percentage point. 
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that firms hoarded labor when output slowed after 1995, expecting the
slowdown to be temporary. The potential importance of this phenomenon
can be inferred from the estimated effect of unemployment on the TFP
residual. For the west the coefficient on unemployment is negative as
expected, and significant, but for the eastern states it is insignificant and
has the wrong sign. The authors conclude that whatever hoarding took
place in the east was overwhelmed by restructuring and other factors. 
Many observers have pointed to the industrial structure of eastern Ger-
many and the predominance of small firms as reasons for its low produc-
tivity. Between 1991 and 1995, manufacturing’s share in employment
dropped from over 25 percent to 15 percent, while construction’s share
grew from 10 percent to 17 percent. In 1990 eastern workers tended to be
employed in larger firms than western workers; by 1999 the reverse was
true. The authors look for clues to the importance of these factors in
explaining aggregate wage differentials and the Solow residual. In their
wage equations, differences in industrial composition and firm size have
trivial effects on the size of the wage gap. They find that changes in firm
size have a weakly signiﬁcant effect on TFP growth: growth in the share of
small firms in the east is estimated to have reduced TFP growth rates by
0.4 percentage point. They also explore whether migration, by removing
the most productive individuals from the east, could be another factor
depressing eastern productivity. However, disaggregating labor into four
age groups and redoing the TFP calculations shows little difference from
the aggregated results. 
The extraordinary increase in eastern wages that quickly followed uni-
fication is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the rise in eastern unem-
ployment. The authors associate this initial wage increase with several
institutional developments. Western German labor unions were quickly
established in the east, and a western German system of industrial relations
was introduced. The unions were able to set relatively high wages in many
industries, motivated in part by concerns for equity and the welfare of east-
ern workers, and the introduction of western welfare and social insurance
raised reservation wages, reducing the cost of losing a job. The unions
negotiated generous industrial agreements with employers’associations,
some of which supported high wages as a way of retaining skilled work-
ers who might otherwise emigrate. However, as it became clear that high
wage rates were making their firms uncompetitive, an unprecedented
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tions and abrogating their collectively bargained agreements. The impor-
tance of collective bargaining agreements in setting wage levels
diminished steadily after 1993.
Although collective bargaining was thus responsible for the abrupt
rise in wages, the authors reason that wages would have risen substan-
tially, if more gradually, with integration even in the absence of powerful
unions and generous welfare benefits. The convergence of wages was
roughly in line with the convergence of productivity throughout the
period, and productivity was bound to increase with the rapid transfer of
capital and technology from the west. Furthermore, the option of emi-
grating to the west would have raised reservation wages in the east even in
the absence of unions. As it happened, union membership in the east
declined from nearly 50 percent of workers in 1993 to about 22 percent
in 2000, compared with a drop in the west from 25 percent to 18 percent.
Meanwhile the share of employees working for firms belonging to
employers’associations declined from 76 percent in 1993 to 34 percent
in 2000, by which time 29 percent of employees were being paid below
union wages for their industry and region. There was little further con-
vergence of eastern wages to western levels. But neither was there any
important widening of the wage gap. 
Most analysts believe that the unions raised wages generally to levels
that were too high for full employment. A related question is whether
they pursued equality at the expense of the relative wage changes needed
to achieve an efficient reallocation of labor across sectors. Burda and Hunt
report that inequality, as measured by the difference in log wages between
the 90th percentile of the distribution and those at the 10th, in fact rose
rapidly in the east and by 1999 had reached western levels. Wage equations
estimated for east and west show that this growth in inequality is roughly
equally divided between within-group and between-group increases
(where groups are defined by age, education, tenure, and characteristics
of the job, ﬁrm, or industry). The authors use similar equations to calculate
how much of the growth in wages between 1990 and 1999 reﬂects changes
in observable characteristics of workers, and how much reﬂects differences
in the returns to these characteristics. They find that very little of the
increase in wages is due to changes in observable characteristics. In earlier
work Hunt found that low-paid workers had seen the sharpest fall in
employment and the largest wage gains. Although this seemingly sup-
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xv
0332-01 BPEA Editors Sum  1/3/02  15:29  Page xvports the hypothesis that the unions have caused unemployment by rais-
ing wages, particularly for the low skilled, the same pattern of employment
losses occurred in the west, where wage gains for the low skilled were no
higher than for others. This leads the authors to examine the experiences of
the full range of skill groups. From the 1990 sample they create twenty
skill groups of equal size, measuring skill as they did in their analysis of
wage convergence. They then calculate the increase in wages and the
change in employment for each skill group over the period. When the def-
inition of skill takes into account employer characteristics such as firm
size, high-skilled workers do substantially better than low-skilled workers.
However, if these characteristics are ignored in defining skill, this verdict
is, if anything, reversed. The authors regard these results as too weak to
force a rejection of their strong prior beliefs that wage increases were not
efﬁciently distributed across ﬁrms and industries in the east and have thus
contributed to low employment.
Burda and Hunt believe the primary motivations for emigration prior
to the parliamentary elections in 1990 were twofold—political reasons and
family reunification—but that after that date economic reasons became
dominant. To explore the importance of economic factors, the authors esti-
mate an equation explaining gross migration flows between states by the
wages and unemployment rates in the source and the destination state,
allowing for time effects and fixed state effects and controlling for east-
to-west migration flows relative to within-west flows. The results suggest
that wage differentials are the most important economic factor in explain-
ing migration and are more important at the start of the period than later.
Unemployment in the destination state is important, but contrary to the
usual presumption, unemployment in the source state is not significant.
Disaggregating by age group, the authors ﬁnd that wages are important for
all ages, with the youngest workers most responsive. Unemployment in the
source state has a substantial and significant effect on the migration of
the oldest group, but no effect on the migration of the youngest. With the
young accounting for a disproportionate share of migrants, this unrespon-
siveness presumably accounts for the insigniﬁcance of source-state unem-
ployment in the aggregate results. 
Burda and Hunt conclude on a note of guarded optimism. Looking to
the future, they observe that the overarching question is whether eastern
Germany will resume the process of convergence that had been so promis-
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tion grew rapidly. The east is still dependent on transfers from the west, the
labor market is still in disarray with unemployment extremely high, and
TFP growth has fallen below western levels. But the authors regard the
convergence of the wage structure to that of the west as a sign that wages
are becoming more ﬂexible and less of an impediment to the efﬁcient dis-
tribution of labor and capital. Although it is hard to allocate the blame for
the east’s productivity shortfall among the wide range of contributing fac-
tors, they believe there are some ways in which public policy could help.
Public infrastructure still lags behind the west in some areas, and the
authors recommend continued investment in public goods. Despite
increased wage ﬂexibility, labor markets continue to need attention. How-
ever, Burda and Hunt believe that public training programs are overdone,
and they are skeptical about public works jobs. At the same time, they
argue, the German authorities should be more concerned with getting
incentives right, for example limiting the ability of the unemployed to
receive beneﬁts after rejecting job offers. However, they maintain that the
services offered to the unemployed through public labor ofﬁces are bene-
ﬁcial and should be expanded. 
JAPAN’S STAGNATION SINCE THE start of the 1990s has moved it from the
front of the growth pack among industrial economies to the rear. And with
the recession deepening during 2001, its economic performance is get-
ting worse, not better. Most analysts saw Japan’s initial economic slump in
the early 1990s as a reaction to the bursting of its real estate and stock mar-
ket bubbles. The exposure of the banking sector to these asset price
declines was a serious problem, but few if any observers expected that
bad loans and insolvent banks would still hang over the economy a decade
later. In the intervening years, a succession of Japanese governments have
announced macroeconomic policy actions to restore growth. But except
brieﬂy in the mid-1990s, the economy has continued to stagnate or decline.
By the end of the decade, already-large budget deficits and falling prices
had led many to conclude that neither fiscal nor monetary stimulus could
be effective, and cleansing the banking system of insolvent banks and
bad loans had become the main policy prescription. In the second paper
of this issue, Kenneth Kuttner and Adam Posen reexamine this long period
of Japanese stagnation, which they and others call the Great Recession.
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use this experience to test conventional views about the effectiveness of
ﬁscal and monetary policies.
Kuttner and Posen begin with a brief review of the decade, including
an assessment of Japanese output growth relative to various estimates of its
potential. Because Japan’s growth rate changed so abruptly after the
1980s, there is little agreement on true potential output, and hence on the
size of the gap between actual and potential at any point in time. The Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) provides
each year an estimate of Japan’s potential; this estimate is based on pro-
jections of potential inputs that are then entered into an aggregate pro-
duction function, together with an assumption about the rate of
unemployment above which wages accelerate—the wage NAIRU. The
authors also calculate an estimate of potential based on a latent-variable
statistical methodology, which relies on two main assumptions: that actual
output eventually reverts to potential, which is unobservable directly but
evolves smoothly over time; and that the behavior of inflation is reliably
linked to the output gap, which serves a purpose similar to that of the wage
change relation in the OECD estimates. By both these measures of poten-
tial, Japan in early 2001 was operating 3 to 4 percent below its potential. 
However, the authors reason, both these estimates may understate the
growth of potential and thus the size of the output gap. They note that
price and wage stickiness can make short-term inflation an unreliable
indicator of the NAIRU or of the output gap in the two models. Further-
more, in the latent-variable methodology, with its assumption of mean
reversion for actual output growth, any prolonged period during which the
economy operates below potential will lead to an artificial downward shift
in the estimate of potential. Moreover, the authors judge that the OECD
estimates are based on projections of labor and capital inputs at potential
that are likely to be too pessimistic: labor inputs because they ignore ris-
ing retirement ages and increased participation of women, capital inputs
because they do not properly account for quality improvements in recent
vintages. To underscore these possible shortcomings of the available esti-
mates, they recalculate potential output combining actual labor inputs dur-
ing the 1990s under the assumption that potential labor productivity
growth since 1992 has continued at its average annual rate over 1980–92
of 2.5 percent. This calculation results in an 11 percent output gap in
1999. Even a slowdown to 1.5 percent annual productivity growth would
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Although together these various estimates highlight the uncertainty in
quantifying Japan’s underperformance, its persistence is setting new
records for an industrial economy in the postwar period, and by any reck-
oning the output gap has grown since the end of the 1990s.
Monetary policy is the main line of defense against an economic slump,
and Japan’s policymakers have been criticized for not using it more force-
fully earlier in the 1990s. More recently, as prices have declined, the con-
cern has grown that monetary policy can no longer be effective. The
interest rate channel, through which monetary policy is usually thought
to operate, is effectively closed, because short-term interest rates are
already near zero. And there is a risk that increasingly negative inflation
rates will raise real interest rates in the future. The authors thus explore
whether monetary policy might be an effective stabilizer through other
plausible channels. The main candidates would raise inﬂation or expecta-
tions of inflation, or would depreciate the currency, and they would pre-
sumably have to operate through monetary aggregates that the central bank
can influence. This leads the authors to look for evidence of a connection
between monetary aggregates and these potential policy targets.
The authors’statistical tests of the historical behavior of M2 and the
main price indices in Japan show that they are difference stationary, mean-
ing that their changes in response to a shock tend to be highly persistent.
Further tests reveal M2, prices, and real output to be cointegrated, indi-
cating that a connection might exist between M2 and prices that mone-
tary policy could exploit. Estimated impulse responses based on a vector
autoregression (VAR) of the three variables predict that persistent M2
shocks would produce persistent effects on prices. However, parallel tests
using the monetary base—the aggregate that the central bank can affect
most directly—reveal no historical cointegration with prices and give poor
out-of-sample predictions of prices for the 1990s. The authors conclude
that, even if faster M2 growth could be relied on to raise prices, the cen-
tral bank would be unable to affect M2 if, as during the 1990s, banks are
unable or unwilling to lend the additional reserves.
Altering the exchange rate of the yen would be another way of affecting
the real economy. However, the authors note that the conventional route
to depreciating the currency, by lowering interest rates, is not available to
Japan. They present results of statistical tests showing that no other link
from the monetary base to the exchange rate is important once interest
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ronment, even the small residual effect that they find would be operative.
This leaves them to consider the plausibility of monetary policy announce-
ment effects. As Paul Krugman and others have argued, a credible com-
mitment by the central bank to high inﬂation in the future could stimulate
the economy in the present low-interest-rate environment. While conced-
ing the logic of such arguments, the authors are skeptical that announce-
ments by policymakers could have the needed effect on the inflationary
expectations of businesses and consumers. And they provide evidence
that recent policy announcements in Japan have not inﬂuenced bond rates.
This leads them to conclude that monetary policy’s ultimate role in the
present situation may, by necessity, be limited to accommodating an
expansionary ﬁscal policy. 
Hence the authors turn to an examination of countercyclical ﬁscal pol-
icy, whose effectiveness has also been questioned in the present environ-
ment. Skeptics argue that Japan has taken conventional, expansionary
budget measures and that they have failed. One problem with evaluating
this claim is that budget data for Japan, where responsibilities are shared
between the central and local governments, are not as transparent as are
those for the United States. Generally accepted statistics from Japan’s Eco-
nomic and Social Research Institute indicate that a sizable surplus at the
start of the decade gave way to deficits beginning in 1993, which grew
almost without interruption in each subsequent year. By 1999 the deﬁcit on
this measure was ¥35 trillion, or 6.8 percent of GDP, and central govern-
ment debt was roughly equal to annual GDP. However, the authors point
out that these budget outcomes are themselves importantly affected by
the stagnation of the economy. Revenue and transfer expenditure depend
on the level of economic activity, and rising deficits during a period of
stagnation can result from this reaction of the budget as an automatic sta-
bilizer, just as rising deficits during brief recessions do. The conventional
way of dealing with this issue is to calculate what the budget surplus or
deficit would have been if the economy were operating at potential.
Changes over time in this measure can be interpreted as changes in the
thrust of fiscal policy, since they are uncontaminated by the endogenous
reactions of the budget to deviations from the potential output path. 
Although these considerations make it clear that Japan’s actual deﬁcits
over the 1990s are not a useful basis for evaluating fiscal policy, in light
of the great uncertainty about the potential output path of the Japanese
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surplus at potential. Instead they estimate ﬁscal impacts using a structural
VAR model in which real tax revenue, real expenditure, and real GDP are
mutually endogenous variables subject to shocks. The model, adapted
from work by Olivier Blanchard and Roberto Perotti, is estimated using
annual data for fiscal years 1976–99 and combining the accounts of the
central and local governments. It allows for contemporaneous effects of
GDP on receipts but not expenditure, and for no contemporaneous effects
between receipts and expenditure except for an effect of tax shocks on
spending. All other interactions are lagged one year. Although such restric-
tions could influence the estimated parameters, the authors believe they
correspond to the institutional setup for fiscal policy in Japan. The esti-
mation procedure also allows for a linear trend and a trend interacting with
a post-1990 dummy variable, and to permit the other parameters to be
identified, it fixes the elasticity of revenue to GDP at 1.25, a value taken
from other studies.
The estimated equations show that current expenditure and lagged rev-
enue have significant effects on GDP, with the expected signs, indicating
that fiscal policy is effective in the conventional way. Calculating the
dynamic effects of shocks to taxes or expenditure over a four-year horizon,
the authors again ﬁnd support for the effectiveness of ﬁscal policy. A ¥100
tax cut raises GDP by a cumulative ¥484, and a spending shock of the
same size raises GDP by ¥353. Such estimates do not, however, measure
the conventionally understood impact of a one-time policy shock. They
take as endogenous any changes in taxes and spending after an initial
shock, thus embodying in the estimation any historical tendency of policy-
makers to either augment or offset any initial policy shock as well as any
effects of the automatic stabilizers. The authors suggest that the tendency
for taxes to rise in the years after a rise in expenditure probably accounts
for the observed difference in the estimated dynamic effects of taxes and
spending.
The authors augment this general analysis by addressing specifically
whether fiscal policy in Japan has become ineffective, as some observers
argue. They estimate a time-series regression of a form first suggested by
Michael Hutchison, regressing private saving (adjusted for social security)
as a percentage of GDP against a number of alternative fiscal variables,
also expressed as percentages of GDP, and the old-age dependency ratio,
which itself might have affected saving in this period. Using the overall
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able has a positive (although insigniﬁcant) coefﬁcient, a result that is con-
trary to what the life-cycle hypothesis would predict when, as in Japan,
population aging is due to a declining birth rate. The effect of the budget
balance, although significant and negative, is small, implying that only
12 percent of a change in the budget balance is offset by reduced private
saving. The authors point out that this is very far from the 100 percent
offset predicted by Ricardian equivalence. When tax revenue and govern-
ment expenditure are included in the equation in place of the overall bud-
get balance, the authors estimate that 32 percent of a change in revenue is
offset by private saving, whereas expenditure, although insignificant, has
the wrong sign, with private saving augmenting rather than offsetting the
effect of the budget balance. Neither the social security balance nor inter-
est expenditure is significant when added to this equation. The authors
conclude that Japan’s experience offers little support for the Ricardian
notion that private saving offsets public dissaving. They further observe
that, in contrast to some countries where fiscal contraction appears to have
been expansionary because they seemed to be approaching binding bor-
rowing constraints, Japan has had low interest rates and little or no foreign-
held or foreign currency–denominated debt.
Kuttner and Posen turn ﬁnally to a discussion of Japan’s banking crisis
and the effects it may be having on the real economy. They sketch the
evolution of Japan’s postwar financial system and review how the crisis
emerged and why the government’s unwillingness to deal with it deci-
sively at the start only made matters worse as the decade progressed. But
their main purpose is to examine whether the banking crisis itself has
contributed to the stagnation of the real economy. Bank lending will fall in
response to weakness in real activity that reduces loan demand. But the
causality can also run the other way, with a reduction in the willingness
or ability of banks to supply loans contributing to weakness in aggregate
demand and real activity. Ben Bernanke has identified bank closures as a
factor contributing to the depression of the 1930s. With Cara Lown, he has
shown similar effects from the thrift industry crisis in the United States in
the late 1980s. However, Kuttner and Posen note that analysis of Japan in
the 1990s has generally concluded that lending was constrained by
demand rather than supply. 
Kuttner and Posen investigate this issue with a set of regressions relat-
ing, alternatively, bank lending, business investment, and the tankan sur-
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expected to affect loan demand and one of two proxies intended to capture
the degree of stress in the banking system: changes in the real price of com-
mercial real estate and changes in the real stock price of banks. They also
include two dummy variables to capture changes in the competitive envi-
ronment and in the regulatory environment. The first covers the first half
of 1998 through the first half of 1999, when Japan’s banks had to pay a pre-
mium in international markets for overnight money and when private savers
moved money from banks to postal savings accounts. The second covers the
first half of 1998 through the second half of 2000, a period of heightened
regulatory scrutiny. The regressions using real estate prices to proxy for
bank stress start in 1976, and those using stock prices start in 1983. 
From these regressions, the authors conclude that bank stress produced
significant reductions in the supply of loans from banks and, through this
channel, contributed to weakness in the real economy. The two bank stress
proxies are always significant, helping explain real loan growth in both
city (nationwide) banks and regional banks, tankan lending attitudes, and
real investment. The authors calculate that the decline in real estate prices
between 1992 and 1995 had an effect on bank lending equivalent to the
regressions’estimate of the effect from a 3-percentage-point rise in inter-
est rates. They also calculate that the sharp decline in stock prices in the
ﬁrst half of 1992 caused a 3 percent decline in lending. The dummy for the
period of increased competition is also signiﬁcant, whereas the dummy for
intensified regulatory scrutiny is not; this, the authors suggest, may show
that scrutiny has not intensiﬁed much after all. 
In closing, Kuttner and Posen discuss what policymakers can learn from
Japan’s experience. Their own analysis leads them to conclude that the
conventional countercyclical tools of ﬁscal and monetary policy work. Tax
cuts and spending increases are expansionary, and Ricardian equivalence
effects are not large enough to be relevant to stabilization policy. They
believe that, in the first half of the decade, monetary policy focused too
much on inflation, and that subsequent developments showed that a liq-
uidity trap is a distinct threat to the conventional and normally reliable
interest rate channel for stabilization. A general lesson they take from this
experience is that monetary policy should not fear accelerating inflation
when inflation is low. They observe that financial fragility can affect the
real economy, and that avoiding needed bank closures and forcing banks to
roll over loans, as Japan’s authorities have done, does not avoid these real
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xxiii
0332-01  BPEA  Editors  Sum    1/3/02    15:29    Page  xxiiieffects and may only increase the eventual cost of banking reform. The
authors also call attention to two important issues raised by their review
of Japan’s experience but not directly addressed in their analysis. One is
whether Japan would have been better off if it had been more integrated
with international capital markets. They suggest that stabilization tools
might then have been less effective, but that the discipline of international
capital flows might have kept them from getting into so much trouble in
the ﬁrst place. The other is why Japan’s political system was so unrespon-
sive to the structural and stabilization problems that emerged. They leave
this question as an important topic for future exploration. 
SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES ARE WIDELY known to be more generous in
Europe than in the United States. Income taxes in Europe are typically
more progressive, transfers more generous, social safety nets stronger
and more encompassing, and regulations to protect workers and the poor
more extensive. There is, of course, variation among the European coun-
tries, but even the United Kingdom, the least generous, provides more
social welfare than the United States. The implications of these differences
for economic performance and for the well-being of the typical citizen
have generated considerable research. In the third paper of this issue,
Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote explore a differ-
ent question: Why is Europe so different from the United States in this cen-
tral dimension of public policy? 
The authors first show that the differences are not of recent origin.
Although the expansion of public sectors on both sides of the Atlantic
began in the late nineteenth century, from the outset the European coun-
tries led the way. In 1870 U.S. government expenditure on subsidies and
transfers was 0.3 percent of GDP, compared with 0.9 percent in Europe.
Those shares were 2.1 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively, in 1937;
5.0 percent and 11.5 percent in 1960, when a significant expansion of wel-
fare programs began; and 11.0 percent and 21.0 percent in 1998. This long
history of persistent and growing differences leads the authors to exclude
explanations that are specific to certain periods or events. 
The authors also document differences over a range of social welfare
categories. Examining Germany, Sweden, and the United States in some
detail, they show that benefits for families with children, for health care,
for sickness and accidental injury, for disability, and for poverty relief are
all less generous and of shorter duration in the United States. In all the
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average wages than in the United States, labor market regulations are more
protective of workers, and unemployment beneﬁts last longer and (except
in the United Kingdom) are more generous. The fact that this greater Euro-
pean generosity prevails across a range of social goals suggests that there
are broad underlying reasons for the differences. 
The authors provide an analytical discussion of the way individuals’
preferences, efﬁciency cost, income mobility and the uncertainty of future
income, and characteristics of the political system affect the political
process that determines the amount of income redistribution. Guided by
this discussion, the authors turn to an empirical investigation that attempts
to account for the observed differences in redistribution. They first look
at economic explanations but find ambiguous results. Greater before-tax
inequality might be expected to lead to greater redistribution. That would
not appear to help explain U.S.-Europe differences, however, because Gini
coefficients reveal noticeably greater before-tax inequality in the United
States than in Europe. On the other hand, the authors note that redistribu-
tion in Europe could take place in ways that affect the observed before-
tax income distributions, for example through higher minimum wages.
Another factor, a lower perceived efficiency cost of redistribution, might
also be expected to matter. But the authors find little evidence that taxes
are less distortionary in Europe than in the United States. They note that
differences in income mobility—the ease with which a household moves
up or down the income distribution—could also help explain differences in
redistribution, although the sign of the effect depends on what drives
income mobility. If voters near the median of the income distribution
expect above-average income growth in the future, they are likely to favor
less redistribution, whereas if they face a greater risk of exogenous shocks
to their income, they will likely favor more. The authors review various
earlier studies of the mobility and variability of income but find no clear
verdict. Thus none of their evidence on economic explanations helps
account for the observed differences in redistribution. 
Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote next examine possible political expla-
nations for Europe’s greater welfare generosity. They first focus on the
degree to which political systems are based on proportional representa-
tion. This form of representation gives greater voice to minorities, who,
the authors hypothesize, tend to favor transfer programs, than does
majoritarian representation, in which the preferences of the median voter
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vious study by other authors. The first uses data for general government
for the countries of the OECD and Latin America; it measures propor-
tionality by a continuous variable that attempts to capture the share of
electoral votes that guarantees a party a parliamentary seat in a typical
electoral district. The larger the needed share, the further the system is
from proportional representation, since it is then more difficult for small
parties to win a seat. In cross-country regressions explaining transfers as
a share of GDP in just the OECD countries, and including GDP per capita
and the percentage of the population over age sixty-five as control vari-
ables, the proportionality variable (which tends to be higher in Europe)
is highly significant. 
These OECD results do not seem to apply across a broader set of coun-
tries, however. When the Latin American countries are included in the
sample, and a dummy variable for Latin America is added to the regres-
sion, the proportionality variable remains signiﬁcant, but its coefﬁcient is
cut in half. The reason for the smaller coefficient is revealed in a scatter-
plot, which shows that the effect of proportionality in the Latin American
countries has the opposite sign from that in the OECD countries. 
Turning to their second data set, which includes many more countries,
the authors are forced to change some of the variables in their analysis.
The dependent variable is now social spending as defined by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, and two new political variables are introduced: the
ﬁrst simply indicates whether a country has a presidential regime, and the
second assumes the value of one if a country has a majoritarian electoral
system and zero otherwise. These equations also include additional
regional dummies. Neither political variable is significant in this regres-
sion. The authors conclude that proportionality is significantly associated
with redistribution across the OECD countries, but not across countries
from the developing world. 
The authors recognize that the regressions just described capture only
one of many political and institutional features that distinguish the United
States from Europe. Furthermore, they acknowledge that these features
may themselves be endogenous, reflecting more basic preferences of the
populations in either recent or distant history, and that these basic prefer-
ences may themselves be closely related to a taste or a distaste for redis-
tribution. In this spirit they discuss historical experiences and concerns that
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tributive policies today.
Following their analysis of political institutions, Alesina, Glaeser, and
Sacerdote turn to a wide-ranging exploration of theories about behavior,
seeking to answer why the median voter in Europe might be more disposed
than the median voter in the United States to support policies to help the
poor or to favor redistribution more generally. Their discussion centers
on evidence about racial prejudice and the behavioral concept of recipro-
cal altruism. Numerous studies identify racial discrimination as impor-
tant in many settings, and the authors judge it to be more important in the
United States than religious differences, which loom large elsewhere in the
world. In the context of welfare, the concept of reciprocal altruism predicts
that nonrecipients will oppose welfare spending if they believe that recip-
ients are taking advantage of the system. The authors suggest that such
beliefs may, in turn, be related to the racial makeup of the recipient popu-
lation. They cite a number of studies whose results are consistent with the
idea that race is important in shaping people’s attitudes toward others.
From such evidence they infer that the much greater racial heterogeneity
of the United States, together with the disproportionate share of minorities
among its poor, may be an important reason why the political taste for
redistribution is lower here than in Europe. 
To examine these ideas more formally, the authors conduct a number
of regression analyses aimed at establishing the importance of various fac-
tors in shaping people’s attitudes toward redistribution. They ﬁrst report on
cross-country regressions that use racial fractionalization, defined as the
probability that two randomly drawn individuals in the same country are of
different races, to explain social spending as a share of GDP. The data set
is that used in the analysis of majoritarian regimes described above, cov-
ering a large number of countries worldwide. The majoritarian regime
dummy, regional dummies, GDP per capita, and the percentage of the pop-
ulation that is of working age are additional explanatory variables. The
authors ﬁnd that racial fractionalization is signiﬁcant and has the expected
negative sign, whereas the majoritarian regime variable is also correctly
signed but not quite signiﬁcant. When they substitute ethnolinguistic frac-
tionalization for racial fractionalization, it is not signiﬁcant. 
Using U.S. data for 1972–98 from the General Social Survey, the
authors next investigate how individual Americans’views on whether
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xxvii
0332-01  BPEA  Editors  Sum    1/3/02    15:29    Page  xxviiwelfare spending should be increased correlate with various personal
characteristics. In one regression they find that the single largest coeffi-
cient is on the race of the respondent, with African Americans 23 percent
more likely than others to favor more welfare spending. They also find a
significant negative coefficient on the respondent’s income and a
U-shaped pattern for educational attainment, with those with the least edu-
cation (high school or less) and those with the most (postgraduate educa-
tion) voicing the strongest support for more spending. Support for more
welfare is also importantly related to living in a large city, whereas gender,
marital status, and number of children are less important correlates. When
the analysis is restricted to whites, three new variables, each introduced
separately, are revealing. Support for welfare is negatively related to the
proportion of blacks living in the same state (although the effect is not
significant), significantly negatively related to the belief that blacks are
lazy, and significantly positively related to whether the respondent has had
a black person over to dinner within the past few years. The authors pur-
sue the role of race further in a different set of regressions, this time relat-
ing the generosity of a state’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program in 1990, before the 1995 welfare reform, to the share
of its population that is black. In a regression that also includes states’
median income, they find that a 1-percentage-point increase in the share
of the population that is black reduces a state’s maximum AFDC pay-
ment by $7 a month. They see this set of results as supporting the idea that
racial heterogeneity is one of the most important reasons why the wel-
fare state in America is so much smaller than in Europe.
The authors next try to relate welfare differences to the concept of
reciprocal altruism, brieﬂy summarized as the idea that people respond in
kind to the way others act toward them. An application of this idea would
be that people who believe welfare recipients are taking advantage of them
will tend to disfavor income support programs. Citing as a classic example
Ronald Reagan’s apocryphal welfare queen living high on taxpayer dol-
lars, the authors observe that antiwelfare forces often frame the political
discussion along such lines. But for their purpose the more interesting
question is why this discussion is so different in the United States than in
Europe. Opinions about poverty, they point out, are very different in the
two places. 
What forces might account for such different opinions? The authors
offer a number of observations that they feel provide clues. There is a
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United States, but a much weaker pattern in European countries. The
American ethos for hard work may reflect Puritan beliefs that still influ-
ence attitudes today. Negative attitudes toward welfare recipients may also
stem from the greater social isolation of the poor in the United States. In
a different vein, the authors suggest that Americans may be more com-
fortable about punishment in general—Americans overwhelmingly sup-
port the death penalty and believe that the courts are too lenient in
punishing criminals—and such an outlook may carry over to punishing
welfare beneﬁciaries. 
Again using data from the General Social Survey, the authors test these
propositions among U.S. respondents, at the same time examining the pos-
sible role of occupational mobility, which they measure as the mean dif-
ference between the occupational prestige of a respondent and his or her
father. Here the idea is that people who have bettered themselves are likely
to feel that the poor could do the same if they tried. The authors regress
support for welfare on occupational mobility, support for capital punish-
ment, church attendance, and whether the respondent is Protestant, along
with the range of personal characteristics used in the regressions on race
described above. All the new variables are negatively related to support for
welfare, and the role of personal characteristics is as before. 
Turning to cross-country data from the World Values Survey, the
authors ﬁnd important differences in beliefs about the poor between Euro-
peans and Americans. By wide margins, relatively more Europeans believe
that the poor are trapped in poverty, that luck determines income, and that
the poor are not lazy. They also examine whether these beliefs, and their
opposites, are related to self-identiﬁcation as being on the left wing of the
political spectrum, which the authors take as a proxy for supporting wel-
fare. However, these results do not lend strong support to the idea that left-
wing orientation is consistently associated with these beliefs. Nor do other
cross-country regressions, including attempts to relate social spending to
the belief that luck determines income, and attempts to explain leftist polit-
ical orientation, uncover signiﬁcant relations. 
The authors’answer to why redistribution is so much greater in Europe
than the United States thus centers on personal attitudes and on political
institutions. They ﬁnd little role for economic explanations. Their conclu-
sion emphasizes that the majority of Americans believe that redistribution
favors racial minorities, and that they live in a fair and open society, so that
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the American political system, which is geared toward preventing redis-
tribution, is likely to be endogenous, reﬂecting these basic beliefs. 
OVER THE LAST CENTURY THE average annual return on stocks has
exceeded that on short-term government bonds by more than 5 percent-
age points. Economists have long been puzzled by the magnitude of this
equity premium. Although equities are much riskier than bonds, such a
reward for risk taking is much larger than that predicted by most empiri-
cal studies based on the standard models of consumer saving and port-
folio choice. There have been numerous attempts to explain the puzzle,
invoking nonstandard consumer preferences on the part of consumers or
costs and limitations on investment allocations, but none have been
notably successful. In the fourth paper of this issue, Jonathan Parker pro-
vides a possible explanation that stays within the framework of the stan-
dard model. 
According to the standard model, risk premiums on stocks should
reﬂect a negative correlation between equity returns and the marginal util-
ity of income. Since we expect consumption to be positively correlated
with equity returns, marginal utility should be low when stock returns are
unusually high, and vice versa. Hence positive excess returns add less to
utility than negative excess returns of the same size subtract, so that, for
any given expected return, equities have a lower value than risk-free assets.
But as measured empirically, the contemporaneous, quarter-by-quarter
covariation of consumption with the stock market is low. As a conse-
quence, it requires an enormous, and implausible, sensitivity of marginal
utility to consumption to rationalize the historical risk premium. To
address this puzzle, Parker proposes two variations on the empirical appli-
cation of the model: the ﬁrst is a focus on “medium-term risk,” or the cor-
relation of consumption with lagged rather than contemporaneous equity
returns; the second allows for the possibility that the covariation of mar-
ket returns with the consumption of those who actually hold stocks is
much greater than their covariation with aggregate consumption per capita. 
Parker begins by reviewing the canonical model for explaining the con-
sumption, saving, and portfolio decisions of households and showing why
it implies an incredibly high degree of risk aversion as conventionally esti-
mated. According to the model, households seek to maximize the present
discounted value of utility from consumption, where utility is additively
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the constant-relative-risk-aversion form. An optimizing household must be
indifferent between investing in the risk-free asset and investing in equi-
ties. Assuming that returns on equity and consumption growth are condi-
tionally log-normally distributed, it is straightforward to show that this
implies a degree of risk aversion, for a given expected value and variance
of the excess return, that is inversely proportional to the covariance
between the consumption growth rate and the excess return. In principle,
these variances and covariance should be conditional on information 
available at the time of an investment decision, but Parker shows that
empirically it makes little difference whether one uses conditional or
unconditional estimates of variances and covariances. 
In U.S. quarterly data from 1959 to 2000, the average annual equity pre-
mium is about 5.3 percentage points, the unconditional standard devia-
tion of excess returns is about 16 percent, and the unconditional covariance
is 0.00017. This implies a degree of risk aversion for the typical household
of roughly 380. Parker observes that economists would find a value of
about 4 plausible, and anything above 10 implausible. A risk aversion of
10 would imply that a household would give up 19 percent of its con-
sumption with certainty in order to avoid the risk in a 50-50 chance of
increasing or reducing its consumption by 25 percent. A value of 380
would imply that the household would give up more than 24 percent of
its consumption to avoid that same risk. Parker also illustrates the puzzle
another way: with a risk aversion of 4, a household facing risk as measured
by the contemporaneous covariation should be indifferent between holding
stocks and holding bonds only if the equity premium is less than 0.1 per-
centage point, not the 5.3-percentage-point historical average.
Parker then turns to a discussion of the rationale for measuring
consumption risk as the medium-term risk, or the covariation of the one-
period excess return with consumption growth over a horizon of S quar-
ters. He shows analytically that medium-term risk is approximately
correct even if risk calculated from contemporaneous covariation as in the
textbook model is exactly correct, whereas medium-term risk is superior
to the textbook model under a wide variety of possible deviations from
the model. In principle, an innovation in equity returns could lead to a
change in future risk-free rates, leading in turn to a significant revision
in planned consumption over the following periods. In that case Parker’s
measures of medium-term risk would be inappropriate. If, however, future
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medium-term risk properly measures consumption risk. He shows that,
empirically, the error in making this assumption is insignificant. 
On the other hand, there are many plausible reasons why the calculation
based on the textbook model would overestimate the degree of risk aver-
sion, and the medium-term risk measures would be more appropriate.
Parker describes three types of reasons. First, suppose market returns are
correlated with transitory factors that would affect the marginal utility of
next period’s consumption. Then changes in the marginal utility of con-
sumption are not well measured by contemporaneous consumption
growth. As the horizon lengthens, the correlation of such factors with the
current equity return is likely to fall, making Parker’s measure of medium-
term risk more accurate. Constraints on consumers’access to informa-
tion, costs of calculation, or costs of adjusting consumption are examples
of a second type of reason, all implying that consumption, and hence mar-
ginal utility, adjust slowly to the new optimal level following a shock to
equity returns. In a recent paper, Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson present
a fully worked out example of this type in which the costs of monitoring
lead households to check their portfolios and adjust their consumption
infrequently. Finally, reasons of the third type involve measurement errors
such that aggregate consumption data measure consumption responses
with a delay, even if the true response is instantaneous. 
For his empirical work, Parker considers consumption horizons of up to
eleven quarters and uses two alternative consumption measures, each with
its advantages. The first is real consumption per capita on nondurable
goods and services less expenditure on education services, medical care
services, housing services, personal business services, and footwear. This
measure, which he calls “ﬂow consumption,” seems to be a good approx-
imation to the theoretical concept of consumption, removing from the
usual measure expenditures that have a substantial element of investment
(such as education) or reﬂect regrettable necessities (such as medical care)
that do not affect marginal utility in the usual way. Parker’s second mea-
sure is total consumption expenditure less expenditure on education, med-
ical care, and personal expenses. He recognizes that this measure, which
does not exclude durable goods purchases, is unorthodox, since utility
comes from the service ﬂow from durables, not from expenditure on them.
However, he argues, over long horizons the new level of expenditure on
durables is proportional to the new level of the stock, and hence to the new
xxxii Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2001
0332-01  BPEA  Editors  Sum    1/3/02    15:29    Page  xxxiilevel of durable services. Since increased consumption of the services
from durable luxury goods may be an important part of the response to
unexpected high returns, this consumption measure may be appropriate
when calculating medium-term risk. 
Parker first calculates unconditional covariances of excess equity
returns and consumption growth using his two measures of consumption.
As previously noted, the contemporaneous covariance of returns and ﬂow
consumption is very low, indeed statistically insigniﬁcantly different from
zero. Given the variance of equity returns, this covariance implies flow
consumption growth of only 0.06 percent above average when equity
returns are 10 percent above normal. The contemporaneous covariation
of total consumption expenditure with returns is even lower. In both cases
the covariance jumps dramatically when the horizon is extended to one
quarter ahead; it then increases gradually as the horizon stretches further,
so that at a consumption horizon of six quarters the covariance exceeds the
contemporaneous covariance by an order of magnitude or more. This
implies that estimates of risk aversion using these longer horizons are
approximately one-tenth those implied by the contemporaneous measures
of risk. 
The estimates so far make no attempt to utilize current information to
improve on unconditional forecasts of either excess returns or consump-
tion. Parker observes that, empirically, the stochastic process of equity
returns shows that, after a series of particularly high returns, subsequent
returns are on average lower, and vice versa. Eliminating the predictable
component of returns may give different estimates of risk aversion and
narrow the confidence intervals on those estimates, which are quite large
when using unconditional covariances, even when uncertainty in the pre-
mium itself is ignored. To investigate this possibility, Parker estimates a
three-variable vector autoregression (VAR) relating excess returns, the log-
arithm of consumption, and the dividend-price ratio, which historically has
been a relatively good predictor of future returns. The system not only
allows conditional forecasts of future returns, but also provides a clear pic-
ture of the response of consumption to innovations. Each variable is
included with four lags. Excess returns are ordered ﬁrst so that the impulse
responses measure the impact on consumption of an innovation to returns.
Parker notes that innovations to returns should not be taken as structural,
but rather as an amalgam of structural shocks to the economy such as news
about labor income or future returns. Hence the estimated impulse
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though it is relevant to the measurement of medium-term risk. This system
is estimated for both consumption measures. 
The impulse responses are interesting on their own. For example, for
either consumption measure, most of the consumption response has taken
place by the end of five quarters, but even at that horizon consumption
has increased less than 0.1 percent for a 1 percent innovation in excess
returns. Using the estimates from the VARs, Parker computes medium-
term risk for the various horizons and the implied risk aversion coeffi-
cients. The latter are in the range of 30 to 40 at a horizon of a year, similar
to those for the unconditional estimates. The conditional estimates are
more precisely estimated, however, with standard errors roughly two-
thirds as large as those for the unconditional estimates. 
Using data from the entire sample period to estimate the response of
consumption to excess returns takes advantage of information not avail-
able to households investing in real time. To see whether this artificial
element in the VARs is important to his conclusions, Parker performs a
similar exercise using the same predicting variables but running a series of
rolling regressions, so that the information set used to predict returns
includes only data available to agents at the time. The results are much
the same for horizons up to eight quarters. Beyond that they diverge but are
highly uncertain. 
Parker concludes that although the medium-term risk to consumption is
much greater than that calculated from the contemporaneous covariation
of returns and consumption growth, it is still much too low to resolve the
equity premium puzzle. In an attempt to narrow the gap further, he invokes
the other feature of the stock market that he regards as potentially impor-
tant, namely, the fact that only a fraction of households own equities. 
Because so many households do not hold equities, the covariation of
fluctuations of aggregate consumption with stock market returns may be
a poor indicator of the risks faced by households that do. It would not be
surprising, for example, to find that the consumption of equity holders is
more dependent on equity returns than that of non–equity holders, indi-
cating correspondingly higher risk for the former. To investigate this issue,
Parker uses data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to con-
struct a series measuring the consumption growth of equity-owning house-
holds. He believes this survey contains the best household-level data on
consumption over time in the United States; it also includes not only
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of stocks, bonds, and other financial assets. Using these household data,
Parker constructs ﬂow consumption and total consumption expenditure per
effective person in the household. After dropping outliers, Parker aver-
ages the growth rates of consumption per effective person to arrive at a
measure of the growth of consumption for stockholding households. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to the use of CEX consumption
data rather than the aggregate data from the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA). Parker notes that the CEX consumption series has sig-
nificantly more measurement error than the aggregate series, but if the
errors are proportional to consumption and have a zero mean conditional
on true consumption, the calculation of the medium-term risk based on
that series will still be unbiased. The CEX data also cover a shorter period
than the aggregate data, so that a greater fraction of the data come from the
recent period of unusually high excess returns in the stock market, and,
possibly, of higher covariances of returns with consumption. To provide a
baseline for comparison, therefore, Parker redoes the aggregate analysis
for the same period covered by the CEX data, 1979–98. He ﬁnds that even
though the medium-term risk for this period is considerably higher, if the
higher average returns are taken to be expected, the corresponding risk
aversion coefficients are typically roughly double those estimated for the
entire sample. 
Is the medium-term risk calculated for equity owners from the CEX
data greater than the risk calculated from the aggregate data for the same
subperiod? Parker finds that, for both measures of consumption, the
answer is yes. The contemporaneous covariances are at least five times
larger than those estimated from the aggregate data, and as with the aggre-
gate data, the covariances rise signiﬁcantly as one extends the horizon. For
the CEX data the medium-term consumption risk is two to four times
greater than the contemporaneous risk, depending on the consumption
measure used. 
Whether investors expected the high rates of return and low covariances
experienced in the 1979–98 period is crucial to these estimates. As men-
tioned above, with the aggregate NIPA data, the estimates of risk aver-
sion for this subperiod were roughly double the estimates for the entire
period. To allow for the possibility that the CEX estimates are unduly
driven by the atypical experience of these years, Parker calculates the ratio
of risk aversion estimated from the aggregate data for the CEX subperiod
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aversion estimates by this ratio. The resulting estimates of medium-term
risk aversion range from 5 to 10 for ﬂow consumption and from 3 to 8 for
total consumption, well below estimates using aggregate data for the
whole period. 
The CEX data on stockholders differ from the aggregate NIPA con-
sumption data in a number of ways. As Parker notes, one difference is
that the CEX data on consumption growth are aggregated from individual
households, whereas the NIPA consumption growth data not only con-
found the distribution of consumption with movements in the typical
household’s consumption, but do not account for the fact that some house-
holds die, immigrate, emigrate, or are “born” into the sample between
periods. A second difference is that the NIPA consumption data include the
spending of nonprofit organizations. A third is that the CEX covers a
smaller, nonrandom sample and excludes rural and military households
and students living in dormitories. 
To explore how important these differences are, Parker constructs a
pseudo-NIPA consumption series for all households from the CEX data by
mimicking the NIPA method of aggregation. Estimates of the consumption
risk of equity using this pseudo-NIPA series are lower than those reported
above for stockholders, but higher than those using actual NIPA data; the
degrees of risk aversion calculated from the pseudo-NIPA data are roughly
half the NIPA-based estimates. Parker suggests that these calculations give
a reasonable idea of the importance of the remaining differences, which
arise from defining and aggregating consumption differently and from
restricting the sample to stockholders. 
To get an indication of the importance of each of these differences,
Parker calculates the medium-term risk for all households in the CEX,
defined and aggregated in the same manner as for stockholders. Calcula-
tions are done for both conditional and unconditional covariances. The
medium-term risk for stockholders varies with the horizon and averages
roughly a third larger than that for all households. By comparison, using
the CEX definition and aggregation increases medium-term risk by
roughly two-thirds. 
Parker separately examines older households and relatively rich house-
holds, two subpopulations that might be expected to be more dependent on
equities as a source of income and that might therefore be subject to
greater consumption risk from equity than either of the populations con-
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medium-term risk than the typical household, possibly reflecting the fact
that the elderly have substantial amounts of Social Security wealth, whose
returns are safe and uncorrelated with the market. Parker ﬁnds no evidence
that wealthy households, defined as those holding more than $25,000 in
1982–84 dollars in securities (corresponding to the top 36 percent of
stockholding households), bear no more medium-term risk than the typical
household owning stocks. 
The ﬁnding that the medium-term risk of those actually holding equities
is sufficient to resolve the equity premium puzzle does not resolve other
problems. Most notably, as Parker acknowledges, and as stressed by Paul
Willen in his discussion, it does not explain why many households hold no
equity at all. But Parker’s results do suggest that it is unnecessary to follow
some recent research in focusing on signiﬁcantly different models of con-
sumption behavior or nonstandard utility functions to explain risk premi-
ums. Rather, the results point to the need to adopt models of slow
adjustment of consumption to explain not only the equity premium but
asset pricing more generally. The success of the model also raises the tan-
talizing questions of whether equity risk has been reduced by the improved
risk sharing that has taken place in recent years as participation in the mar-
ket has broadened, and whether that broadening has permanently lowered
the premium required for holding stocks. 
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